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In the 2005 satirical comedy Thank You for Smoking,'
tobacco industry spokesman Nick Naylor engages in a theatrical
presentation at a Senate committee hearing about warning labels
on tobacco products. In an exchange that leaves Vermont Senator
Ortolan Finistirre-an unabashed anti-smoking crusader-nearly
speechless, Naylor posits:
I just don't see the point in a warning label for
something people already know . . . [T]he real
demonstrated #1 killer in America is
cholesterol. And here comes Senator Finistirre
whose fine state is, I regret to say, clogging the
nation's arteries with Vermont Cheddar
Cheese. If we want to talk numbers, how about
the millions of people dying of heart attacks?
Perhaps Vermont Cheddar should come with a
skull and crossbones.'
While the movie is satirical, this particular dialogue presents a
thought-provoking point, especially in light of recent developments
in First Amendment law concerning compelled commercial
disclosures and tobacco warning labels. Few industries get as much
*Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2014.
1. THANK YOU FOR SMOKING (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2005).
2. Thank You for Smoking (2005)-Memorable Quotes, INTERNET MOVIE
DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0427944/quotes (last visited Jan. 31,
2013).
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attention by government regulators as the tobacco industry.? Since
1965, when the United States became the first nation to require
health warnings on tobacco packages, the government has
continuously regulated the industry's practices. At one point, the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was so
concerned with tobacco usage that it attempted to assert its own
jurisdiction -without explicit congressional authorization -to
regulate the industry, a practice eventually struck down by the
6Supreme Court. The most recent regulation of the tobacco
industry is by far the most dramatic yet-a requirement of a full-
color graphic warning label that takes up half of the front and back
panels of cigarette packages, effectively turning the packaging into,
what some would say, an anti-smoking billboard.
Circuit courts have split on the constitutionality of the new
graphic warning labels. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States,8 upheld
the regulation on a First Amendment facial challenge, while the
D.C. Circuit, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug
Administration, struck down the government's action on an as-
applied challenge.'0 Taking into consideration the Supreme Court's
3. This author cannot think of any other consumer product within the
United States that requires a full-color warning label.
4. Duff Wilson, U.S. Selects Cigarette Warning Images, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2011, at B1.
5. See e.g., Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (modifying tobacco warning labels).
6. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
7. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (quoting Tobacco Strategy Announcement, FDA (Nov. 10 2010),
available at http://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/newsevents/ucm232556.htm;
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Health and Human Services
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, and FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg
(June 21, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/06/21/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-secretary-health-
and-human-ser).
8. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
9. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
10. Compare Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery Inc., 674 F.3d at 558-59
(upholding graphic warning labels on a facial challenge) with R.J. Reynolds
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prior holdings that commercial speech is subject to a lesser degree
of First Amendment protection, the Sixth Circuit applied rational
basis review" while the D.C. Circuit applied a slightly heightened
scrutiny after adopting a very narrow interpretation of the
commercial disclosure exception to the First Amendment. 2
While the two decisions might be reconciled by the differing
nature of their challenges, the two opinions are especially
significant because of the diverging frameworks they apply in
addressing compelled commercial disclosures. 3  The cases also
bring to a head the question of how much protection commercial
speech should get when government disclosure requirements are
not aimed at mitigating the effects or the possibility of consumer
deception. Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has
addressed the topic of commercial speech on many opportunities.' 4
Unfortunately, these opinions have not always been consistent, and
some have left a patchwork of tea leaves that present important,
unanswered questions on commercial speech's exact position
among other First Amendment speech rights.
Because there is substantial confusion as to the current state
of law for commercial speech and government-compelled
commercial disclosures, the Supreme Court should have embraced
this opportunity to clarify its line of cases regarding what standard
is appropriate for compelled disclosures not aimed at mitigating
misleading commercial speech. Until it does so, we are left with a
constant guessing game as to how to evaluate the constitutional
limitations of such speech. This Recent Development will review
the D.C. and the Sixth Circuit opinions on the graphic warning
labels and the two vastly different approaches they take in assessing
the limits of compelled commercial speech.
Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1208 (striking down the government's action on an
as-applied challenge).
11. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 558-59.
12. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1213-14.
13. See infra Part V.A.
14. See infra Parts III.B and C.
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II. BACKGROUND
Since 1970, as a result of extensive regulations of the
tobacco industry, the percentage of Americans who smoked
tobacco dropped from nearly 40 percent to about 20 percent in
2004, when the descending pattern began to stall." A study from
the National Academy of Sciences, an independent, nonprofit
research organization established by Congress, found that the once-
effective textual warning labels had become "unnoticed and stale,
and they fail to convey relevant information in an effective way." 6
Further, a finding that "virtually all new users of tobacco products
are under the minimum legal age to purchase such products"" and
that adolescents "misperceive the magnitude of smoking harms and
the addictive properties of tobacco and fail to appreciate the long-
term dangers of smoking,"' 8 compelled Congress to revise the
tobacco warning labels for the first time in over twenty-five years.'9
In 2009 with overwhelming, bipartisan support,20 Congress
enacted, and President Barack Obama signed, the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.2 1 In addition to a host of
provisions regulating the sale, manufacture, and advertising of
cigarettes, the Act also called for a dramatic change in the warning
15. Feds Seek Full Court Review of Cigarette Warnings, USA TODAY,
Oct. 9, 2012, available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/
10/09/cigarette-warnings-review/1622975.
16. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291 (Richard J. Bonnie, Kathleen Stratton, &
Robert B. Wallace eds., 2007).
17. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No.
111-31, § 2(4), 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
18. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 16, at 293.
19. Wilson, supra note 4. The last time Congress modified the warning
labels was the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).
20, The bill passed 298-112 in the House of Representatives, with
support from 227 Democrats and 71 Republicans, and 79-17 in the Senate,
with support from 54 Democrats and 23 Republicans. Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, GovTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.com/congress/bills/111/hrl256 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
21. H.R. 1256, 11" Cong. (2009).
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labels on cigarette packaging.22 While tobacco companies
previously were required only to include a textual "Surgeon
General's Warning" on their package labels and advertisements,2 3
the new regulations require a graphic warning comprising of the top
half of both the front and back panels of the package, as well as
twenty percent of every advertisement.24 Additionally, the
language within the textual warnings was changed to be more direct
25and explicit of the negative consequences of smoking.
In 2011, after reviewing over 1900 public comments,
scientific literature, and the results of an 18,000-person study, the
FDA selected nine final warning labels out of thirty-six proposed.2 6
The vivid warning labels include images of a corpse, a man exhaling
smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his neck, a heavily damaged
lung, and a close-up of a mouth with damaged and tarred teeth and
a lesion on the lips. 27 In addition, each image includes a statutorily
established warning message and the number "1-800-QUIT-NOW,"
28
a hotline for smoking cessation services.
22. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
23. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
474 § 4(a)(1)-(2), 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).
24. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 201, 123.
25. For example, one warning was altered from "SURGEON
GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
Emphysema And May Complicate Pregnancy," Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act § 4(a)(2), to "WARNING: Smoking can kill you." Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 4(a)(1).
26. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76
Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141); see also
FDA Unveils New Cigarette Health Warnings, FDA CONSUMER HEALTH
INFORMATION (June 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/UCM259865.pdf; see also Appendix.
27. The other, less graphic images include a crying woman, a cartoon
baby crying in an incubator, a man wearing a t-shirt with the words "I Quit"
emblazoned across the front, and a baby enveloped in a cloud of smoke. See
Health Warnings for U.S. Food and Administration regulation "Required
Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements,"
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/UCM259401.pdf;
see also Wilson, supra note 4.
28. Id.
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Tobacco companies responded to the new graphic warning
labels by filing suits in both the District Courts of D.C.29 and
Western Kentucky0 alleging a violation of their First Amendment
rights." Applying strict scrutiny, the D.C. District Court held the
new warning labels to be a violation of the First Amendment,3 2
while the Western District of Kentucky applied intermediate
scrutiny and held the regulations to be permissible. On appeal,
while disagreeing with their respective district courts' selected
standards of review, both the D.C. Circuit 34 and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals35 affirmed the rulings of their lower courts on the
issue of the constitutionality of the new warning labels, creating a
circuit split on the question of what is the proper standard of review
for commercial disclosure requirements.
29. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C.
2011).
30. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512,
519 (W.D. K.Y. 2010).
31. Id. at 528 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff at 44, Commonwealth Brands,
Inc., v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (2010) (No. 1:09-CV-117-M)); see
also Mark Morgenstein, Tobacco Giants Suing FDA Over Warning Labels
Mandate, CNN (Aug. 17, 2011, 2:03 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/08/17/cigarette.labels.lawsuit/index.html
("The primary complaint is that we think it violates the First Amendment for
the government to require people who produce a lawful product to essentially
urge prospective purchasers not to buy it . . . .").
32. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d at 47-49 ("To withstand
strict scrutiny, the Government carries the burden of demonstrating that the
FDA's Rule is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.").
33. See Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 532 ("[W]here the
statute regulates speech it regulates commercial speech and must therefore
satisfy the requirements set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).").
34. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221-22 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
35. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
523-24, 531 (6th Cir. 2012), affd sub nom., Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v.
United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. K.Y. 2010), reh'g denied.
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III. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK
As a general matter, the Constitution protects both
individuals6 and commercial entities" from government attempts
to compel speech. The law began to chip away at this general
proposition, however, after the Supreme Court established
commercial speech as a type of speech that was to be afforded
some, but not as much, protection under the First Amendment as
other forms of speech." Before 2001, it was generally recognized
that the existing jurisprudence had separated compelled speech and
commercial speech into two distinct frameworks." However,
between 1997 and 2001, the Supreme Court issued three seemingly
inconsistent decisionso regarding the forced subsidization of
commercial speech, bringing the commercial speech and compelled
speech doctrines closer together, with some arguing that the
Supreme Court had created a hybrid compelled commercial speech
doctrine.
A. Barnette and the Creation of the Compelled Speech Doctrine
One of the most important values underlying the First
Amendment is that, in a democracy, the people retain the ultimate
authority to decide matters of public policy. In order for the people
to effectively exercise that self-determination, all relevant
36. See W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
37. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1943)
(plurality opinion) (citations omitted) ("[S]peech does not lose its protection
because of the corporate identity of the speaker . . . . Were the government
freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with
which they disagree, this protection would be empty.. ...
38. See infra Part III.B.
39. Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech
Conundrum, 19 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 205, 207 (2011).
40. Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled
Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods,
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 555 (2005-2006).
41. Royal, supra note 39, at 206.
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information must be out in the open and freely considered.4 2
Consequently, the more that information and ideas are made
public, the better. The Supreme Court has adopted this underlying
principle in its First Amendment jurisprudence. 43  A second,
related, First Amendment principle is that it protects not only the
speaker, but also the listener's interest in receiving information in
the marketplace of ideas." "As the Supreme Court has explained,
'[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.' The government may not distort that marketplace with
forced messaging." 45 These two central First Amendment tenets
form the basis of the doctrine of compelled speech.
In 1943, the Supreme Court established the compelled
speech doctrine in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette," striking down a state policy requiring all students in the
public schools to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of
Allegiance.4 7 In holding that the First Amendment protected both
the right to speak and the right to remain silent, the Court
grounded its opinion on the notion that saluting the flag indicated
consent or approval of the government and its actions, and "the Bill
of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that
consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not
public opinion by authority."" With the backdrop of World War II
and the nation's global war against totalitarianism, the Court
ominously warned, "[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of
dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
42. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 15-16 (1948).
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[Wle
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... ).
44. Royal, supra note 39, at 210.
45. Id. at 210 (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969)).
46. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
47. Id. at 627-29, 642.
48. Id. at 641.
448 [Vol. 11I
2013] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
graveyard." 4 9 The Court was concerned that compelling citizens to
adopt political positions would violate their "freedom of mind," a
concept that the Court adopted from its previous freedom of
religion cases.so In closing, the Barnette Court eloquently declared
the principle:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.5 '
Thus, the principle that would eventually form out of Barnette was
that given the importance of the speech interests, government
attempts to compel speech would only survive if they passed strict
scrutiny.52 Under strict scrutiny, the government can only restrict
fundamental constitutional rights if such restrictions are narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.53
The landmark Barnette case did not settle the compelled
speech question, but rather set off a half-century of debate on what
limits, if any, existed on the prohibition of government enforced
speech. For example, Barnette dealt with issues of public opinion
on important public policy and political matters, arguably the most
important form of protected speech under the First Amendment.54
But does commercial speech have the same "constitutional value"
under the First Amendment? The Court answered this question in
the negative.
49. Id.
50. Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44
CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 336-337 (2007-2008).
51. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
52. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
53. See First Nat'l. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
54. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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B. Zauderer, Central Hudson, and the Commercial Speech Doctrine
While the Supreme Court has been zealous in its protection
of compelled speech relating to matters of public opinion and
political debate, it has limited constitutional protection for
commercial speech,56 generally defined as speech that "does no
more than propose a commercial transaction,"" to a level
"commensurate with its position in relation to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression." Advertising, as opposed to political
speech, was given less protection because it was viewed as an
"economic right" rather than actual "speech." 5 9
One year before its decision in Barnette, the Supreme Court
declared that "the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."6" That
commercial speech was completely outside the scope of First
56. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). The
Court stated in Ohralik:
We have not discarded the common-sense distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction,
which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech. To
require a parity of constitutional protection for
commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such
a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate
with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation
that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (citation
omitted).
58. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Caren Sweetland, Note, The Demise of a Workable Commercial
Speech Doctrine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to
Commercial Disclosure Requirements, 76 TEx. L. REV. 471, 485 (1998).
60. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
2013] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Amendment protection was the prevailing belief' until the
Supreme Court dispelled this notion in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,62 which clarified
that commercial speech was subject to a limited degree of
protection under the First Amendment.63 To reach that conclusion,
the Court emphasized that the First Amendment not only protected
the speaker, but also the receiver of speech.64 In this case, a
resident of Virginia challenged the State's ban on the advertisement
and promotion of prices for prescription drugs by pharmacists. 65
Affirming principles from earlier cases, the Court pointed out that
the First Amendment included the right to "receive information
and ideas,"" and specifically cited a case where it struck down a ban
on advertising that "contained factual material of clear 'public
interest."'6 7 Because the Court considered prices of prescription
drugs essential to consumer decision-making in a free market
economy, it was a "matter of public interest" that such consumer
decisions "be intelligent and well informed," and therefore they
could not be prohibited without ample justification. Perhaps most
importantly for future commercial speech cases, the Court made
clear its disapproval of regulations that were based on government
paternalism and the idea that government protection of citizens
depended on "their being kept in ignorance." 69  A better
alternative, according to the Court, was:
61. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 758 (1976) (noting that "in past decisions the Court has given some
indication that commercial speech is unprotected").
62. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
63. Id. at 770.
64. Id. at 756.
65. Id. at 751-52.
66. Id. at 757 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763
(1972)).
67. Id. at 760 (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975)). It is
important to point out that, in this case, the Supreme Court struck down a ban
on receiving factual information -that is, the actual price of prescription
drugs. See id. at 752, 762-64. And thus, the holding should be interpreted as
stating that the government cannot keep consumers from finding out factual
information about a product. See id. at 764-65.
6& Id. at 765.
69. Id. at 769-770.
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[T]o assume that this information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them.
Foreshadowing future holdings, the Court spelled out instances in
which government could subject commercial speech to regulation.n
These instances included time, place, and manner restrictions, as
well as commercial speech that was false or misleading.7 Within a
decade after the Court's holding in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, the Court would further elaborate on the different types
of levels of protection for commercial speech. When it comes to
regulation of commercial speech, there are two classes of
regulation, creating two different standards of review, depending on
the nature of the speech being regulated and the means of
regulation being used.74
1. Central Hudson and Intermediate Scrutiny
The first class of commercial speech regulation encompasses
restrictions on commercial speech that is both lawful and not
misleading or deceptive. In Central Hudson Gas and Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission, the Court struck down
a permanent ban on advertising that promoted electricity use.
Nothing in the prohibited advertising was inaccurate or
misleading.78 Giving substantial weight to the consumer's interest in
70. Id. at 770.
71. Id. at 770-72.
72. Id. at 771.
73. See infra Parts III.B.i and III.B.ii.
74. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S.
622,641-42 (1994).
75. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
522-23 (6th Cir. 2012).
76. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
77. Id. at 558-59, 571-72.
78. Id. at 566.
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receiving accurate information, the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny. 9 While it found that energy conservation was a substantial
state interest, the Court held that an outright, blanket ban on all
advertising was impermissibly overbroad because it failed to show
that "a more limited restriction on the content of promotional
advertising would not serve adequately the State's interests."8
Thus, Central Hudson established that commercial speech
that is lawful and not misleading or inaccurate is afforded a higher
level of protection, and government restrictions on such speech are
subject to intermediate scrutiny.8' When regulating speech within
this category, the government must prove: (1) a substantial interest,
(2) that the "regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted," and (3) that the regulation "is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest."2 In carrying its burden, the
government cannot use "mere speculation or conjecture; rather ...
[it] must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."83 This
demonstration does not have to be overly exacting; rather, it can be
made "by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different
locales,"84 and, in some circumstances, speech restrictions can be
justified "solely on history, consensus, and 'simple common
sense.""' In addition, the Supreme Court has subsequently made
clear that the standard as to the third prong is not the least
restrictive means, but instead requires a "reasonable 'fit between
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends, . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective."' 86
79. Id. at 563-64.
80. Id. at 570.
81. See id. at 564 ("If the communication is neither misleading nor
related to unlawful activity, the government's power is more circumscribed,").
82. Id. at 566.
83. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1995) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (citing Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986)).
85. Id. (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)).
86. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (quoting
Board of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480 (1989)).
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2. Zauderer and Rational Basis Review
The second class of commercial speech regulation
encompasses compelled factual disclosures aimed at correcting or
mitigating false, misleading, or deceptive commercial speech. The
"misleading information" doctrine arose out of Zauderer v. Office
81
of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court. In this case, the
Supreme Court upheld a disciplinary action against an attorney
who advertised to potential clients that they would not pay any
legal fees, but failed to disclose that they would have to pay legal
costs.8  The attorney was punished under a state regulation
requiring attorneys to fully disclose the cost of their services.89 The
Court held that "[bjecause the extension of First Amendment
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value
to consumers . . . appellant's constitutionally protected interest in
not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is
minimal."9
The Court presented two reasons for the application of a
more lenient standard than Central Hudson. First, factual
disclosures are not the same as outright restrictions on speech.9'
Second, the regulation did not involve matters of public discourse.9
Perhaps the most important distinction the court made is that
"when the State requires purely factual disclosures, it does not
prevent speakers from stating anything, but merely requires that
they provide more information."9 '
87. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
88. Id. at 633.
89. Id. at 631.
90, Id. at 651.
91. Id. "[B]ecause disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly
on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, warning[s] or
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required.. .in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception." Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 201 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. ("Ohio has not attempted to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.' The State has attempted only to
prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising. . .
93. Royal, supra note 39, at 220.
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Thus, a speech regulation in the form of a factual disclosure
to correct or mitigate commercial speech that is false, misleading, or
deceptive is subject to a different standard of review than that
applied to restrictions on non-misleading commercial speech.94 The
Supreme Court has endorsed government regulation of commercial
speech that requires compulsion of factual disclosures if they are
"reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception
of consumers."95 This exception is considered necessary to allow
States to "insur[e] that the stream of commercial information
flow[s] cleanly as well as freely." 96
C. The Compelled Subsidy Cases
Since Barnette, the compelled speech doctrine has
developed into two distinct categories: "true compelled speech"
cases, where an individual is compelled to directly express a
message he disagrees with, and "compelled subsidy" cases, where
an individual is forced to express a belief with which he disagrees by
mandatory payment of a fee to support the expression of that
belief.97 The Supreme Court has recognized a limited right against
compelled subsidization since 1977.98 The compelled subsidy line of
cases must be considered when assessing the limits of commercial
speech protections because the Court has often evaluated several
such cases in the context of commercial speech.99 Unfortunately,
the Court has been inconsistent in ruling on such cases and it has
94. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (stating that requirements "reasonably
related to the State's interests in preventing deception of consumers" are
constitution); Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674
F.3d 509, 522-523 (6th Cir. 2012).
95. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
96. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 772 (1976).
97. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 554 U.S. 550, 557 (2005).
98. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
99. See infra notes 106-22.
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added more confusion to the constitutional status of commercial
speech.W
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,o' the Court struck
down a state statute requiring teachers to either join the union or
pay a fee to the union equal to the dues of union members."" The
fees collected would go towards funding, among other activities, the
union's legislative lobbying and support for political candidates."
The Court reasoned that the principles of the First Amendment
"prohibit a State from compelling any individual . . . to associate
with a political party, . . . as a condition of retaining public
employment. "" The Court, however, did not outlaw all compelled
subsidies. Instead, the Court in Abood used the germaneness test:
individuals can be compelled to subsidize speech that is germane to
a sufficiently important state interest.05
In Glickman v. Wileman Brothers. & Elliot, Inc.,'" the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to analyze a compelled subsidy
case in the context of commercial speech. In that case, a federal
regulation required tree-fruit producers to contribute funds to an
advertising campaign to market tree-fruit as "wholesome, delicious,
and attractive to discerning shoppers."'07 The Court upheld the
regulation primarily on the commercial nature of the regulation,
reasoning that the First Amendment is primarily concerned with
compulsion of political and ideological views, and not generic
advertising." Glickman is interpreted to mean "where a message
is commercial it cannot be ideological, and therefore cannot
implicate the compelled speech doctrine. Thus, when the
100. See Post, supra note 40, at 555; see also Gregory Klass, The Very
Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 1087, 1090 (2004).
101. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
102. Id. at 212.
103. Id. at 215.
104. Id. at 234.
105. See Post, supra note 40, at 564-65.
106. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
107. Id. at 462.
10& Id. at 469-70.
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government requires propagating [a] commercial message, it does
not compel speech under the First Amendment."'"
Just four years after Glickman, the Court decided United
States v. United Foods,"o assessing the constitutionality of a
government-compelled assessment to pay for the generic
advertising of mushrooms, similar to the type of advertising
program presented in Glickman."' In this case, however, the Court
struck down the regulation based on the lack of a broader
regulatory scheme.112 More importantly for the constitutional
status of commercial speech, however, was that the Court included
language in the opinion that directly undermined the central
premise in Glickman.'3 The Court recognized that commercial
speech could be ideological in some circumstances because such
speech could be "laden with value judgments and opinions."1 14
Accordingly, United Foods began to undermine the then-prevailing
case law by suggesting that First Amendment concerns are raised
"whenever government forces 'individuals to pay subsidies for
speech to which they object,"' even if it is commercial speech, and
thus courts should not be so quick to defer to regulations as
compelled commercial speech.'15 As one scholar has pointed out,
the decision in United Foods-that compelled subsidization of
commercial speech implicates more than minimal First Amendment
interests-seems to be in direct tension with the holding from
Zauderer that the constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in advertising is
minimal.'16 Perhaps most importantly, United Foods is seen as a
shift away from audience-centered constitutional values, as was the
case in Zauderer, and towards speaker-centered values."7
109. Royal, supra note 39, at 225.
110. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
111. Id. at 408.
112. Id. at 411-12.
113. Royal, supra note 39, at 226.
114. Id. at 225.
115. Post, supra note 40, at 557 (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410).
116. Id. at 576.
117. Id. at 577.
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The Court added yet another factor to be considered in the
compelled subsidy line of cases in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association."" In this case, the Court upheld the assessment of a
marketing fee on beef producers to support promotional
advertising campaigns for beef."9 Instead of deciding the case
based on the purposes of the subsidy, the manner of distribution,
the broader regulatory scheme, or whether the subsidized
expression was commercial speech, as the Court had done in the
past, the Johanns Court upheld the subsidy on grounds that
compelled support of government expression was permissible under
the government speech doctrine.'20 Whereas the previous cases
dealt with the government compelling support for speech of third
parties, the federal government controlled the regulation in
question in Johanns,12' and citizens "have no First Amendment
right not to fund government speech." 22
The compelled subsidy cases have brought a considerable
amount of confusion to the limits of compelled commercial speech.
As one scholar notes, theses cases left important questions
unanswered.' The first is how courts should determine whether to
apply the compelled commercial speech doctrine or whether to
apply Zauderer.12 4 This is particularly troublesome because the
Supreme Court has not set out a specific way to distinguish between
a mandatory factual disclosure and compelled speech. 12 Second, if
courts are to apply the compelled commercial speech doctrine,
should they consider such speech under the "true compelled
speech" doctrine or the "compelled subsidy" doctrine, or something
else? 26
118. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
119. Id. at 553-54.
120. Id. at 562.
121. Id. at 560.
122. Id. at 562.
123. Royal, supra note 39, at 231.
124. Id.
125. Id. "Skilled attorneys may argue that the same regulation falls into
either category. A commercial speaker who does not want to disseminate
information will argue that she disagrees with it, and that it therefore
constitutes compelled speech." Id. at 232.
126. Id.
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IV. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
With so much uncertainty as to the exact status of
compelled commercial speech disclosures in different contexts, it is
unsurprising that, when applying the existing commercial speech
case law to the new tobacco warning labels, the lower courts have
reached differing conclusions. Two federal appeals courts have
recently had an opportunity to weigh the constitutionality of the
government's new graphic cigarette labels-the Sixth Circuit and
the D.C. Circuit. The Sixth Circuit, by a 2-1 majority, upheld the
regulation on a facial challenge. 127 The D.C. Circuit, also by a 2-1
128majority, struck down the regulation on an as-applied challenge.
The difference in approaches to the central framework for
commercial speech taken by the two courts is indicative of the
uncertain state of the law concerning compelled commercial
speech.
A. The Sixth Circuit
In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. Untied States,1 29
Discount Tobacco City and Lottery, a group of manufacturers and
sellers of tobacco products, brought a claim arguing that on their
face, the graphic warning labels violated their rights to freedom of
speech under the First Amendment.o3 0 The Sixth Circuit began its
analysis with a threshold inquiry of whether the regulation in
question was a restriction on speech or a mandatory disclosure
requirement.31 According to the court, Central Hudson could only
be applied to restrictions on speech and never to disclosure
requirements.132 Mandatory disclosures instead would be subjected
127. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Co. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
558-59 (6th Cir. 2012).
128. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (assessing the validity of the promulgated regulation).
129. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
130. Id. at 518.




to Zauderer analysis. After distinguishing between restrictions on
speech and disclosures, the court found the regulation in question
to be a disclosure since it required compelling additional
information, and the court proceeded to review it under
Zauderer.34 Under this standard, the court explained, a disclosure
requirement would be afforded rational basis review if it met two
requirements: (1) the disclosure must present factual information,
rather than personal or political opinion;135 and (2) the disclosure
must target speech that is inherently or potentially misleading. 136 A
disclosure requirement that fails to meet these two requirements,
under the court's framework, would be subject to strict scrutiny. 37
Because the case presented a facial challenge, to show that
the graphic images were not factual, the tobacco company had to
show that "no set of circumstances exist[ed] under which the statute
would be valid."3 In this case, that required a showing that
"graphic warnings [could not] convey the negative health
consequences of smoking accurately."' 39  In other words, the
tobacco companies had to show that it was impossible for pictures
to show factual information. The court found that graphic warning
labels did not meet this standard, using an analogy to students
learning about the body and diseases:
Students in biology, human-anatomy, and
medical-school courses look at pictures or
drawings in textbooks of both healthy and
damaged cells, tissues, organs . .. because those
pictures convey factual information about
medical conditions and biological systems ...
By virtue of our genes and environment, every
person is different. And yet medical students
learn valuable factual information in part by
133. Id. at 554.
134. Id. at 552.
135. See id. at 555.
136. See id. at 558.
137. Id. at 554.
138. Id. at 558-59 (quoting U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct.
1577, 1587 (2010)).
139. Id. at 559.
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examining pictures and images of the human
body and the various illnesses that may befall
it. So arguing that a representation of a medical
condition becomes an opinion when people
could have that medical condition in ways that
deviate from the representation would lead to
the insupportable conclusion that textual or
pictorial descriptions of standard medical
conditions must be opinions as well. People
with the same illness can and often will suffer a
variety of differing symptoms. But one
wouldn't say that a list of symptoms
characterizing a particular medical condition is
nonfactual and opinion-based as a result. So
too with graphic images."'
Further, the court noted that the Supreme Court's holding in
Zauderer itself rejected the argument that graphics could not be
141factual. In Zauderer, the Court rejected the state's attempt to
regulate the use of pictures based on the argument that the use of
illustrations in advertisements created a risk that the public would
be misled by "subtle uses of illustrations to play on emotions."' 42
The Supreme Court explained that "the use of illustrations or
pictures in advertisements serves important communicative
functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser's
message, and it may also serve to impart information directly." 43
While the Supreme Court was addressing the broader question of
whether government could restrict commercial speech, the Sixth
Circuit interpreted the opinion to imply that pictures in general
could be accurate and factual.'"
Next, the court addressed the question of whether there was
a threat of consumer deception. The Sixth Circuit first pointed out
that there was an ongoing threat of deception due to the fact that
140. Id. at 559.
141. Id. at 560.
142. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648).
143. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647).
144. Id.
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the tobacco companies "knowingly and actively conspired to
deceive the public about the health risks and addictiveness of
smoking for decades."l 45  The court was persuaded by the
government's contention that the existing text-only warning labels
failed to "effectively convey the risks of smoking" for several
reasons, including that they were easily overlooked, not prominent,
stale, and that they required a college reading level and, thus, were
inappropriate for the young Americans that the government
intended to target.'" In response to the tobacco company's
argument that the warnings could not be justified on the basis of
preventing consumer deception because consumers knew the health
risks of tobacco,147 the court said that even if it were true that
consumers were fully aware of the health risks, an advertiser's
rights are adequately protected as long as the requirements were
reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing
consumer deception, and no further inquiry was needed.148
Thus, having established that the threshold requirements for
Zauderer were met, the court proceeded to apply rational basis
review. In examining whether the graphic warning labels were
reasonably related to the purpose of preventing consumer
deception, the court looked to the experience of other jurisdictions,
finding that the government's solution of graphic labels was
reasonable based on the success that Canada, Brazil and Thailand
had with the adoption of similar warnings. 4 9 In response to the
argument that the graphic labels would not actually reduce tobacco
use, the court cited a Second Circuit opinion, holding that under
Zauderer the government only needed to show that "it was
probable that some consumers would change their behavior in
response to the disclosures." 0 Finally, the court countered that
even if it were true that the graphic labels would not actually reduce
tobacco use, that was irrelevant:
145. Id. at 562.
146. Id. at 563-64.
147. Id. at 566-67.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 564 (citing Nat'1 Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115
(2d Cir. 2001)) (emphasis in original).
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The purpose of the warnings is to prevent
consumers from being misled about the health
risks of using tobacco. What matters in our
review of the required warnings is not how
many consumers ultimately choose to buy
tobacco products, but that the warnings
effectively communicate the associated health
risks so that consumers possess accurate,
factual information when deciding whether to
buy tobacco products."'
After extensive analysis of the problems with the existing warning
labels' failure to effectively convey health warnings, the court
concluded that "based on common sense . . . larger warnings
incorporating graphics will better convey the risks of using tobacco
to consumers."15 2 What is clear from the Sixth Circuit opinion is
that the court is very willing to defer to the judgments of the
government regarding the state of consumer information and the
means necessary to address any deficiencies. This deference, as will
be seen, varies substantially from the approach the D.C. Circuit
took.'
B. The D.C. Circuit
Contrary to the holding in the Sixth Circuit, in R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration,154 the D.C.
Circuit adopted a narrow construction of Zauderer along with an
expansive application of Central Hudson to hold that the graphic
warning label provision was a violation of the tobacco company's
commercial speech rights.'55  In the D.C. Circuit's view, the
threshold question to determine the level of review was whether
156there was a threat of consumer deception. According to the
151. Id. at 567.
152. Id.
153. See supra Part IV.B.
154. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
155. Id. at 1221-22.
156. See id. at 1213-14 (beginning analysis of the proper level of review
based on the question of whether there was a threat of consumer deception).
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court, "a disclosure requirement is only appropriate if the
government shows that, absent a warning, there is a self-evident -
or at least 'potentially real'- danger that an advertisement will
mislead consumers."' Additionally, the court adopted the view
that "Zauderer does not stand for the proposition that government
'can constitutionally compel the use of a scripted disclaimer in any
circumstance in which its interest in preventing consumer deception
might plausibly be at stake.""" Based upon this narrow view, the
court held that "in the absence of any congressional findings on the
misleading nature of cigarette packaging itself, there [was] no
justification under Zauderer for the graphic warnings."1 59
Furthermore, the court held that even if cigarette packaging
contained misleading information, the graphic warnings would still
not be held to the Zauderer standard because they did "not
constitute the type of 'purely factual and uncontroversial'
information ... or 'accurate statement[s]' . . . to which the Zauderer
standard may be applied." 60 As an example, the court turned to the
image of a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole. This image,
the court found, could easily be misinterpreted as "suggesting that
such a procedure is a common consequence of smoking - a more
logical interpretation than the FDA's contention that it symbolizes
'the addictive nature of cigarettes."'1 6 ' The court also questioned
the messages within the graphics, such as "I QUIT," and the "1-800-
QUIT-NOW" number. To the court, this information did not offer
any unbiased information about the health effects of smoking. 62
The images were not perceived as attempts by the government to
convey purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial information, but
157. Id. at 1214 (citing Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'1
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
158. Id. at 1214 (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. _, , 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343-44 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
159. Id. at 1214-15.
160. Id. at 1216.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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were instead "unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps
embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting.",6 3
Having established that the graphic labels were not subject
to rational basis review because the commercial speech being
regulated was not misleading and the disclosures were not
sufficiently factual, "4 the court proceeded to evaluate the
government regulation under Central Hudson's intermediate
scrutiny standard.'6s First, the court proceeded with the assumption
that the government had a substantial interest in encouraging
smokers to quit and in reducing the number of Americans who use
tobacco.'" The court then turned to the critical inquiry of whether
the graphic warning requirements directly advanced the
government's interest to a material degree. The court found that
the government had "not provided a shred of evidence ... that the
graphic warnings [would] 'directly advance' its interest in reducing
the number of Americans who smoke." 6 7
The court was not swayed by evidence that countries with
graphic warnings had successfully reduced smoking rates because,
according to the court, there was no evidence showing that such
warnings "directly caused" the results. The court further rejected
Australian and Canadian studies that found: (1) the warnings
caused a substantial number of participants to consider quitting
smoking, and (2) the warnings caused increased attempts to quit
smoking.1 6 9 The court reasoned that "it is mere speculation" to
equate thoughts about quitting smoking or attempts to quit
smoking with actual cessation.o70 Such "questionable social science,"
the court concluded, purports to show only that the warnings
"might induce individual smokers to reduce consumption" but not
that they "actually led to a reduction in smoking rates."17 ' Thus, the
163. Id. at 1217.
164. Id. at 1216.
165. Id. at 1217.
166. Id. at 1218.
167. Id. at 1219.
168. Id. (emphasis in original).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (emphasis in original).
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court held, absent the necessary direct evidence that the graphic
warnings will accomplish the government's objective of reducing
smoking rates, the government did not meet its burden under
Central Hudson was not met, and the provision was therefore an
infringement on the tobacco companies' First Amendment rights.172
V. ANALYSIS
The opinions arising out of the Sixth Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit present drastic diverging viewpoints about the extent of
protection afforded to commercial speech. First, the two courts are
split on the proper framework for determining which standard of
review to apply to differing types of regulations on commercial
speech. Second, even if they were in agreement on how to
determine the standard, the two courts also diverge on their
conceptions of how to apply the different standards.
A. Different Frameworks for Commercial Speech
In reaching their conclusions, the two courts based their
analyses on two fundamentally different conceptions of the proper
framework for commercial speech. The Sixth Circuit bifurcated
commercial speech regulations between outright bans on speech
and mandatory informational disclosures, paying no attention to
the content or threat of consumer deception until after the
threshold inquiry. The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, bifurcated
commercial speech between its misleading and nonmisleading
nature, with special attention on the content of the required
disclosure itself during the threshold inquiry. The two divergent
approaches present drastically different results.
Under the Sixth Circuit's framework, the threshold inquiry
is whether the government's action is a restriction on commercial
173speech or a mandatory disclosure. If it is a restriction on
commercial speech, then Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny
172. Id. at 1222.
173. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 552
(6th Cir. 2012).
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standard applies.'7 4 If it is a mandatory commercial disclosure,
Zauderer applies, and then whether rational basis review or strict
scrutiny is employed depends upon whether the disclosure is a
factual statement or opinion."5 Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit's
framework proves to be both under-protective of commercial
speech in that it adopts a broad interpretation of Zauderer's
16requirements, and overprotective of commercial speech in that it
applies strict scrutiny for nonfactual disclosures. 77
Under the D.C. Circuit's approach, the threshold inquiry is
whether a threat of consumer deception exists."8 If the answer is in
the affirmative, Zauderer applies.'79 If the answer is in the negative,
Central Hudson applies.'"
The first major difference between these approaches is that
under the Sixth Circuit's character-of-the-regulation approach,
Central Hudson and intermediate scrutiny is completely irrelevant
in the analysis if the regulation in question is initially deemed to be
a disclosure requirement."' Instead, courts must first decide
whether to apply rational basis review or strict scrutiny.18 Under
the D.C. Circuit's threat-of-deception approach, in contrast, Central
Hudson is relevant regardless of whether the regulation is a
disclosure or a restriction.'83
A second major difference is that under the D.C. Circuit's
approach, commercial speech regulations can never be subjected to
strict scrutiny. Thus, the D.C. Circuit's approach effectively
174. Id.
175. Id. at 555.
176. See infra Part V.B.
177. See supra notes 135-37.




181. Supra note 132.
182. Supra notes 135-37.
183. The Central Hudson standard can apply to both restrictions on
speech and mandatory disclosures. The focus is on whether there is a threat of
consumer deception.
184. This logically follows from the bifurcated framework: if a regulation
targets a threat of consumer deception, it is subject to rational basis review. If
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solidifies commercial speech's position as subordinate to other
types of speech protected by the First Amendment. The Sixth
Circuit, on the other hand, calls for strict scrutiny under the
compelled speech doctrine if a required disclosure is not factual or
there is no threat of consumer deception.s8 5  Thus, the D.C.
Circuit's approach recognizes the increasingly held view that
commercial speech can have high value in public debate, 86 and that
it can be ideological. 8 1
B. Differing Interpretations of Standards of Review
Even if the Sixth and D.C. Circuits could agree on which
standard of review to apply, the two courts' interpretations of each
standard suggests that the courts would nevertheless come out on
different sides. The Sixth Circuit unanimously determined that
Zauderer was the proper standard of review at the outset" and
proceeded under that analysis without discussing Central Hudson in
any great detail. The D.C. Circuit, however, did extensively
analyze Zauderer before settling on applying Central Hudson."9 A
review of the two courts' diverging understandings of Zauderer
presents a stark contrast, as the D.C. court adopted a very narrow
view of the standard, while the Sixth Circuit adopted a fairly broad
view."9
it does not target a threat of consumer deception, it is subject to intermediate
scrutiny. Nowhere does strict scrutiny come into the picture in this analysis.
185. See supra notes 135-37.
186. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976).
187. See supra notes 114-15.
188. Even the lone dissenter, Judge Clay, agreed that Zauderer was the
proper standard to apply. Judge Clay dissented based on his belief that the
majority's application of the standard was too broad. Disc. Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 530 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J.,
dissenting in part).
189. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213-17 (6th
Cir. 2012).
190. For reference, the standard that the two courts are interpreting is:
"an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
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First, the two courts differed on their assessment of whether
a threat of consumer deception with regard to the tobacco industry
existed at all. In the D.C. Circuit's view, disclosures are only
appropriate where there is a "potentially real" danger that an
advertisement will mislead consumers.'91 The D.C. Circuit seems to
view this inquiry as limited solely to the advertisement at the time
the consumer views it. In the case of the tobacco labels, the court
found no threat of deception because the tobacco companies were
already prevented from using descriptors on packages and
advertisements such as "light," "mild," or "low," so there was
nothing misleading about the cigarette packaging or advertisements
themselves that would require disclosure in order to protect against
consumer deception.192  The court goes on to brush aside the
government's remedial justification because the government did
not "frame" the rule as a corrective measure.'93
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit embraced a far broader view of
what constituted deception, considering not just the commercial
speech at the time the consumer sees it, but the surrounding
circumstances of the speech.'9" The court found the government's
remedial justification sufficient based on a legislative record
showing that the tobacco companies had previously engaged in a
"[conspiracy] to deceive the public about the health risks and
addictiveness of smoking," and "in a scheme to defraud smokers
and potential smokers.""' Additionally, the court cited with
approval a Second Circuit interpretation of Zauderer holding that
the "framework can apply even if the required disclosure's purpose
is something other than or in addition to preventing consumer
deception" as long as it is reasonably related to the purpose of
deception of consumers." Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
191. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1214-15.
192. Id. at 1214-15.
193. Id.
194. See infra notes 145-46.
195. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 562
(6th Cir. 2012).
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preventing such deception.'96 The court also directly refuted the
idea embraced by the D.C. Court that Zauderer required a separate
analysis, beyond whether a disclosure was reasonably related to the
State interest in preventing deception of consumers, of whether the
mandated disclosure was "justified."9
A second significant difference between the D.C. and the
Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Zauderer is the permissible content
of the compelled disclosure. The D.C. Circuit set a high bar,
requiring that the government's disclosure contain only "purely
factual and uncontroversial" information.'" The graphic warning
labels, according to the court, failed this test because "they [were]
primarily intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at most,
shock the viewer into retaining the information in the text
warning."'99  Additionally, the court found the labels to be
problematic because the images could be misinterpreted as health
results that will happen rather than results that may happen.2 0 In
contrast, the Sixth Circuit requires neither that the disclosure be
purely factual nor uncontroversial. Rather, the court makes only a
distinction between a fact and a personal or political opinion.201 The
court found it beyond question, both practically and
constitutionally, that images could convey factual information
effectively. 202 According to the court, because the health risks
associated with smoking were supported by scientific evidence, they
were factual.203  And while the images that the D.C. Circuit
analyzed were not yet available at the time of the Sixth Circuit's
196. Id. at 556 (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
197. Id. at 566-67.
198. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1212.
199. Id. at 1216.
200, Id. ("For example, the image of a man smoking through a
tracheotomy hole might be misinterpreted as suggesting that such a procedure
is a common consequence of smoking- a more logical interpretation than the
FDA's contention that it symbolizes the 'addictive nature of cigarettes."').
201. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 555
(6th Cir. 2012).
202. Id. at 559-60.
203. Id. at 561.
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opinion, the Sixth Circuit predicted with fair accuracym what the
images might look like, and concluded that they would convey
factual information accurately without Zauderer concerns.205 In
sum, the Sixth Circuit's approach to reviewing the content of a
disclosure to determine whether it falls within Zauderer's ambit is
far more permissive than the probing inquiry into whether a
message can be misinterpreted or controverted that is characteristic
of the D.C. Circuit's interpretation.
C. Problems with the Two Frameworks
While the conflicting frameworks proposed by the two
courts each have aspects that are in accord with existing precedent,
they also each have their flaws.
An important distinction between the two courts' opinions
is the fact that, under current precedent, Central Hudson's
intermediate scrutiny standard only applies to bans on commercial
speech, and not to commercial speech disclosures.206 The Sixth
Circuit opinion immediately disposed of analysis under Central
Hudson after an initial determination that the regulation in
question was a disclosure.20' On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit
applied Central Hudson after determination that Zauderer did not
apply.208 As a general matter, it is important to note that in every
instance the Supreme Court has ever applied Central Hudson, the
Court has analyzed statutes or ordinances that ban outright some
sort of commercial speech.209 Furthermore, there are important
204. Examples that the court put forward as sufficiently "factual"
included an image of a smoker's lung, and a picture of a person suffering from
a smoking-related medical condition. Id. at 559.
205. Id. at 559-60.
206. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
207. Disc. Tobacco City and Lottery, 674 F.3d at 554.
208. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
209. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States. Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)
(applying Central Hudson to strike down a statute prohibiting advertising of
compounded drugs); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)
(applying Central Hudson to strike down a regulation prohibiting the display
of alcohol content on beer labels); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
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differences between bans on speech and compelled disclosures that
support different standards of review.
The Supreme Court has explicitly noted the "material
differences" between the two types of commercial speech
regulations.210 The heightened scrutiny in Central Hudson was
principally justified on the rejection of the "highly paternalistic
view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate
commercial speech," 21' and the preference for not restricting
information from consumers. Subsequent applications of Central
Hudson have reiterated "the general rule . .. that the speaker and
the audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented."2 12 Thus, disclosure requirements, because
they mandate more information, do not implicate the same
concerns as those restrictions that restrict the flow of information to
the consumer. This concept was affirmed in a recent case where the
Supreme Court upheld a disclosure requirement after explicitly
refusing to apply Central Hudson because the regulation was not
"an affirmative limitation on speech." 213 The main problem with the
D.C. Circuit's framework is that it completes the inferential jump
arising from United Foods that compelled commercial speech not
aimed at mitigating misleading or deceptive speech should be
subject to heightened scrutiny, a jump that the Supreme Court has
214
not yet made.
A second questionable result from these cases is the Sixth
Circuit's introduction of the possibility of strict scrutiny for
mandatory commercial disclosures if it is determined that there is
no threat of consumer deception.215 This is a problem because the
Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (applying Central Hudson to uphold a statute
prohibiting the advertisement of gambling).
210. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471
U.S. 626, 650 (1985).
211. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447
U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 367 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507
U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
213. Milavetz v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010).
214. Post, supra note 40, at 583.
215. See Disc. Tobacco & Lottery Co. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554
(6th Cir. 2012).
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Supreme Court has long recognized that commercial speech is in a
subordinate position to other forms of protected First Amendment
216speech. If the government was compelling corporate speech in a
forum that went beyond the mere proposal of a commercial
transaction, then that forum would not fall into the category of
commercial speech and it would be afforded full First Amendment
protection.2 17 Commercial disclosures, however, are commercial
speech, and affording strict scrutiny (i.e., full First Amendment
protection) to such speech would seem to go against the intentional
distinction the Court has long recognized between commercial and
211non-commercial speech.
Another problem with applying strict scrutiny to
commercial speech that is not aimed at consumer deception is that
accepting such a rule would lead to broad-sweeping consequences
since "commercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled
for reasons that have little to do with" such an end.21 9 As Professor
Post has pointed out, the government currently imposes a litany of
disclosure requirements for products under the objective of
transparent markets, in order to "reduce information costs and
thereby establish a more educated and efficient marketplace." 220
One prime example of such consumer education is the
government's mandate of nutrition labels on food products. Studies
have shown that such labels have a direct effect on consumer
purchase decisions, helping consumers to make better-educated
choices about the foods they purchase and eat.221 Such disclosures,
although having little, if anything, to do with protecting against
misleading advertising or the deception of consumers, serve a
vitally important purpose in educating consumers, and are fully
consistent with the Supreme Court's underlying commercial speech
principle that consumers should have as much access to truthful
216. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
217. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16
(1986) (plurality opinion).
218. See supra Part III.B.
219. Post, supra note 40, at 584.
220. Id. at 584-85.
221. Ollberding, et al., Food Label Use and Its Relation to Dietary Intake
Among US Adults, 111 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N S47, S47 (2011).
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information as possible to make informed decisions.222 If strict
scrutiny were applied to disclosure requirements not aimed at
correcting misleading speech, such requirements would become
suspect under the First Amendment, and would likely be struck
down, resulting in a marketplace populated with less-informed
consumers.
D. Problems with the D.C. Circuit's Application of Zauderer
23
As previously discussed, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits
presented divergent views of how to apply the Zauderer standard.
The D.C. court's narrow reading of the standard is problematic
because it seems to be more protective of commercial speech than
the current Zauderer line of cases suggest.
First, the D.C. court's determination that no threat of
consumer deception existed is problematic when viewed in context
of the Supreme Court's most recent opportunity to apply Zauderer
224in Milavetz v. United States. In Milavetz, the Supreme Court
upheld a federal requirement that bankruptcy professionals disclose
in all advertisements the statement: "We are a debt relief agency.
We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy
Code."225 The Supreme Court upheld the disclosure requirement
because the advertisements were "inherently misleading" in that
they "promis[ed] . . . debt relief without any reference to the
possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs." 226 In
R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. court briefly referenced Milavetz in its
discussion of the distinction between "potentially real" versus
"purely hypothetical" threats to consumer deception,227 but it
ignores some important passages from the seven-Justice majority
opinion, which seemed to construe the Zauderer standard broadly,
222. See supra notes 66-70.
223. See supra Part V.B.
224. 559 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
225. Id. at 1330.
226. Id. at 1340 (emphasis added).
227. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (quoting Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. and Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S.
136, 146 (1994)).
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in favor of more restrictive language than that used in the
concurrence.228 For example, the D.C. court found the
concurrence's statement in Milavetz that Zauderer does not allow
government to "constitutionally compel the use of a scripted
disclaimer in any circumstance in which its interest in preventing
229consumer deception might plausibly be at stake" to be persuasive,
but it did not mention the Milavetz majority's seeming willingness
to defer to congressional judgment:
Milavetz makes much of the fact that the
Government ... has adduced no evidence that
its advertisements are misleading. Zauderer
forecloses that argument: When the possibility
of deception is as self-evident as it is in this
case, we need not require the State to conduct a
survey of the . . . public before it [may]
determine that the [advertisement] had a
tendency to mislead. Evidence in the
congressional record demonstrating a pattern
of advertisements that hold out the promise of
debt relief without alerting consumers to its
potential cost is adequate to establish that the
likelihood of deception in this case "is hardly a
230speculative one . ...
Thus, the D.C. court set a high threshold for the amount of threat
of deception needed before applying Zauderer"', while the
Supreme Court has suggested that the threshold is much lower,
requiring merely a showing of "possibility of deception," or a
"tendency to mislead."23 2
The tobacco warning labels in this case are more analogous
to cases where the Supreme Court has applied Zauderer review
228. Id. (quoting Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1343-44 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment)).
229. Id.
230. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
231. Id. (quoting Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340).
232. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(quoting Milavetz, 130 S.Ct. at 1340).
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than those where the Court has refused to do so. In both Zauderer
and Milavetz, the Supreme Court focused on the concept of
"inherent costs," where the government could compel disclosure on
an advertisement because the advertisement did not fully disclose
the actual price of the product.23 As the dissenting opinion in R.J.
Reynolds aptly pointed out, "[elven absent any affirmatively
misleading statements, cigarette packages and other advertisements
that fail to display the final costs of smoking" are misleading.234
Under this reasoning, the long-term medical consequences of
tobacco use are an inherent cost, and failure to disclose those costs
make the packaging and advertisements inherently misleading.235
Another problem with the finding that no threat of
consumer deception existed is that in searching for whether an
actual or potential threat of consumer deception existed, the court
untenably divorced product advertising from product packaging;
instead, it looked exclusively at the cigarette labels themselves at
the time the consumer sees the product in the store.236 The D.C.
Circuit explained that since tobacco companies were prevented
from deceiving consumers by using descriptors on packages such as
"light," "mild," or "low," there was nothing misleading about the
cigarette packaging itself that would require disclosure in order to
237
protect against consumer deception. In so holding, the majority
fails to recognize two important considerations. First, in most
circumstances, a consumer has likely decided to purchase the
product in advance of entering the store and seeing the product and
238
its packaging. Second, the court's approach discounts the effect of
233. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
234. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
235. Even though tobacco packaging and advertisements already contain
a textual warning, the inquiry at this threshold stage is only whether there is a
threat of deception. If such threat exists, then the regulation is subject to
rational basis review, where the court will defer to legislative judgment as to
the means employed to meet the threat of consumer deception. See supra note
95.
236. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1214-15.
237. Id.
238. A broadly accepted theory of consumer decision-making is the
"hierarchy of effects" model, whereby a consumer goes through several
476 [Vol. 11I
2013] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
an industry's extensive history of defrauding the public of the
health effects of its product.239 The significance of these two factors
is that any deception to the consumer has been completed long
before the consumer actually sees and purchases the product at the
store, and a standard that measures deception at the point of sale
construes the consumer deception interest far too narrowly.
The dissent in R.J. Reynolds points out that the majority
goes against a previous case in the D.C. Circuit concerning remedial
240 241commercial disclosures,2 Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC. In that
case, the D.C. Circuit upheld a compelled disclosure as a remedial
measure where the manufacturers of Listerine mouthwash
previously engaged in an advertising campaign promoting its
product as being beneficial for colds, cold symptoms, and sore
throats.242 The court acknowledged that commercial disclosures
could be compelled where an advertisement, "although not
misleading if taken alone, becomes misleading considered in light of
past advertisements." 243  The dissent read Warner-Lambert as
saying that "a tendency to mislead may arise through efforts to
capitalize on . . . prior deceptions by continuing to advertise in a
manner that builds on consumers' existing misperceptions."2  In
other words, "it is the accumulated impact of past advertising that
necessitates disclosure in future advertising." 245 Thus, under this
theory, the tobacco industry's extensive history of intentionally
deceiving the public about the side effects of tobacco use created a
"stages" of response to advertising, including "conviction" to purchase a
product before actual purchase. CHRIs BERRY, ET AL., STRATEGIC
MARKETING COMMUNICATIONs 52-54 (1999).
239. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
240. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1228-29 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting).
241. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
242. Id. at 752.
243. Id. at 760.
244. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1229 (Rogers, J., dissenting)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
245. Warner-Lambert Co., 562 F.2d at 761 (emphasis omitted).
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consumer misperception that lingers to this day,2 46 and therefore the
247existence of a threat of consumer deception is further supported.
Another problem with the D.C. Court's narrow Zauderer
standard is its requirement that any disclosures under the standard
must be "purely factual and uncontroversial." 2 48 A close reading of
Zauderer reveals that the Supreme Court was more likely
describing a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition to receive
rational basis review. While the disclosure in Zauderer was "purely
factual and uncontroversial," 249 the Zauderer Court emphasized the
"value to consumers of the information" as the principal
justification of the disclosure.250 If the focal point is information
value, it does not make sense to require a factual disclosure to be
"uncontroversial." As the tobacco industry has shown, the
manufacturers of the dangerous product itself can be the creator of
the controversy. 251' Given this power, it would be questionable to
read Zauderer as creating a standard whereby the deceptive
commercial speaker can himself render a factual disclosure
unconstitutional.252
246. See supra notes 15-18, 195 and accompanying text.
247. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1229 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 1212.
249. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
250. Id.
251. In one federal case against the tobacco industry, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals made a factual finding that:
Despite knowledge of "the negative health consequences
of smoking, the addictiveness and manipulation of
nicotine, [and] the harmfulness of secondhand smoke,"
tobacco company executives "made, caused to be made,
and approved public statements contrary to this
knowledge"...Specifically, they "publicly denied and
distorted the truth about the addictive nature of their
products, suppressed research revealing the addictiveness
of nicotine, and denied their efforts to control nicotine
levels and delivery."
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1224 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Philip Morris USA, 556 F.3d 1095, 1121-1124 (D.C. Cir.
2009)).
252. For example, if an entity is being compelled to disclose a health
consequence of its product, that entity can simply fund a study that shows that
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW478 [Vol. 11I
2013] COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
VI. COMPELLED DISCLOSURES OF NONMISLEADING
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Given the stark divisions between the two Circuit Courts,
which is the correct framework to apply for evaluating a regulation
on commercial speech? Based on existing precedent, the answer
seems to be neither. Both the D.C. and the Sixth Circuit opinions
seem to correctly apply existing precedent and principles at some
points, yet deviate at others. At the same time, however, it is
difficult to fully answer this question because the Supreme Court
has left important questions unanswered. For the reasons
presented above, it seems that the Sixth Circuit was correct in
creating a threshold inquiry based on the bifurcation of restrictions
on commercial speech and compelled disclosures of commercial
speech,2 53 while the D.C. Circuit was correct in refusing to apply the
demanding standard of strict scrutiny in any instance of commercial
speech regulation.254 The question that remains is what standard
should apply for compelled disclosures that are not aimed at
mitigating the effects or the threat of misleading commercial
speech. The exact answer is not entirely clear based on the existing
precedent, and this Recent Development will not go too deep in
searching for an answer because many commentators have already
explored the question extensively. It will instead provide a brief
overview of what has been suggested.
One option is to integrate the compelled subsidy cases.
Doing so seems logical because they are so closely related to
compelled disclosures. In the case of compelled disclosures, like for
the product is safe. Does this make the fact of the health consequences
controversial?
253. See supra Part V.C.
254. See supra Part V.B.
255. See e.g., Nicole B. Casarez, Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 63 Mo. L. REV. 929, 932 (1998)
(arguing for heightened scrutiny); Jennifer Keighley, Can You Handle the
Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 539, 543 (2012) (arguing for the application of Zauderer standard);
Sweetland, supra note 59, at 478 (arguing that disclosure requirements should
not be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny).
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compelled subsidies, the government is forcing a private party to
give up a resource-in the form of advertisement or packaging
space-to recite the government's message. But the one major
difference between compelled subsidies and compelled disclosures
is what makes it necessary to include additional protections for the
commercial speaker.
In the case of compelled subsidies, the speaker's resource is
being turned over to a third party, which then uses that resource to
spread a message that is not directly affiliated with the compelled
speaker.256 On the other hand, in the case of a compelled
disclosure, the speaker is forced to directly espouse the compelled
message, and its products are forced to brand a sort of scarlet letter
conveying that message. This distinction is significant, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Wooley v. Maynard ,' because
significant constitutional questions arise whenever a private party is
used as "an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." 259 Whereas in a
compelled subsidy case, the subsidizer of speech can shed himself
from the subsidized message by conveying an opposing message,
such opportunity for disassociation is far more limited (if not
impossible) when the disclosure is directly attached to speech itself.
The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to address
this distinction in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,2 6
where the objecting cattle ranchers argued that crediting of the
subsidized advertising to "America's Beef Producers" implied their
261endorsement of a message with which they did not agree. While
recognizing a distinction between compelled subsidy and compelled
256. For example, in Johnanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 544
U.S. 550 (2005), cattle sellers and importers pay a mandatory assessment for
each head of cattle, which is then used in an advertising campaign to promote
the consumption of beef. Id. at 553-55.
257. Sometimes, that message can be harmless, such as a nutrition label.
Other times, it can be one that is intended to shame those who manufacture
and those who purchase the product, such as graphic tobacco warning labels.
258. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
259. Id. at 715.
260. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
261. Id. at 564.
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speech, the Court rejected the opportunity to clarify the First
Amendment significance of such a distinction.262 Even if the Court
had answered the question, a compelled disclosure on a speaker's
product is arguably more intrusive of First Amendment rights than
a third party message being affiliated to the subsidizer because the
speaker is actually forced to directly spread the controversial
message.
Another option is to expand the application of Zauderer
from disclosures of potentially misleading information to all
commercial disclosures, as the Sixth Circuit does, 263 and as other
commentators have suggested.26 4 This approach makes sense
because, as convincingly argued by Professor Post, Zauderer's
central holding was not that the speaker's interest was minimal
because of the state's interest in preventing consumer deception,
but because the "constitutional value of commercial speech lies in
the circulation of information."2 65 Thus, even if there is no threat of
deception, there is still an important interest in increasing the
amount of information in the marketplace.
One of the primary concerns of compelled speech, and the
reason for applying heightened scrutiny in such circumstances, is
that it is a vehicle by which "government can distort the
marketplace of ideas." 266 Such concerns, however, are minimal
when the speech being compelled is for the purposes of increasing
the amount of factual information upon which the marketplace
26operates.267 If a consumer chooses not to purchase a product or use
a service because he or she learns of a truthful piece of information
about the product or service, then the marketplace of ideas is
working exactly as it should be. Thus, the corporate speaker's
262. Id. at 565.
263. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
556 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Zauderer's framework can apply even if the required
disclosure's purpose is something other than or in addition to preventing
consumer deception.") (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104
(2d Cir. 2011)).
264. See, e.g., Keighley, supra note 254, at 558-59.
265. Post, supra note 40, at 577.
266. Sacharoff, supra note 50, at 333.
267. See, e.g., supra notes 64-70, 220-22 and accompanying text.
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interest in not disclosing factual commercial information is not
nearly as significant as its interest in not being compelled to speak
non-commercial information.268 On the other hand, the problem
with applying Zauderer is that doing so would not supply as much
protection of the commercial speaker as the Supreme Court seems
to be moving towards after United Foods.
A third option is to apply intermediate scrutiny, as the D.C.
269Circuit did. On the one hand, it is faithful with the concerns of
United Foods, where the Court put forward the idea that
commercial speakers retain "constitutional interests that must be
balanced against state interests in compelling subsidization of
commercial speech." 27 0  On the other hand, government has a
substantial interest in an educated and efficient marketplace, 27 1
which requires the ability to ensure that consumers know about the
products and services they purchase. By going beyond intermediate
scrutiny, both of these concerns are considered and addressed. A
counterargument to intermediate scrutiny would be the possibility
that heightened review could "amount to an insurmountable
barrier" to commercial regulation, 2 72 and put in jeopardy a number
of disclosure requirements that provide important consumer
information.27 Such a result, it has been argued, could undermine
integrity in the marketplace and undermine the free flow of societal
information.
One final possibility is to apply strict scrutiny. At least one
Justice has suggested dismantling the distinctions between
commercial and noncommercial speech altogether, proposing
instead that all commercial speech regulations be subjected to the
268. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985).
269. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir.
2012)
270. Post, supra note 40, at 582.
271. Id. at 583.
272. Sweetland, supra note 59, at 492.
273. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
274. Sweetland, supra note 59, at 477.
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highest standard of review.27 The idea that strict scrutiny should be
applied in commercial speech cases has also has been supported by
at least one commentator,2 76 who argues that although compelled
commercial speech outside the consumer protection context does
not result in "ideological traumas," they still invoke concerns about
violations of the speaker's freedom of expression. The primary
concern is that, absent a consumer protection context, a commercial
speaker's First Amendment rights would be subject to majority
rule.7  Strict scrutiny is further supported because, as seen above,
such disclosure requirements bear close resemblance to the
compelled speech cases such as Wooley v. Maynard, where the
speaker becomes an instrument for spreading the objectionable
speech.279  Such a solution, however, would have severe
consequences for the consumer market.280 Just as with the problem
of intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny would bring into question an
innumerable amount of essential disclosure requirements currently
in place to keep consumers informed about the products they use
and consume.28' Furthermore, it would undermine long standing
First Amendment precedent and principles that recognize the value
of commercial information to consumers.
275. See e.g., Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for
asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial'
speech.").
276. Casarez, supra note 255, at 932. The commentator argues that strict
scrutiny should be used for compelled disclosures not aimed at preventing
consumer deception. Id.
277. Id. at 962.
278. Id.
279. Supra notes 256-58.
280. Casarez, supra note 255, at 931 ("If compelled commercial speech is
given the same First Amendment scrutiny as forced ideological speech, the
fear is that the government will be unable to mandate disclosure requirements
to prevent fraud, deception, or other commercial harms.")
281. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.




The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Discount Tobacco City &
Lottery and the D.C. Circuit's opinion in R.J. Reynolds bring to the
forefront a question that the Supreme Court has struggled with for
over four decades. Based on the Supreme Court's vague and
sometimes inconsistent precedent, neither the D.C. nor the Sixth
Circuit seems to be completely correct in their frameworks. We
cannot be sure what the proper standard is to apply for commercial
speech disclosures not aimed at consumer deception, however,
because there are so many questions left unanswered under the
current line of cases. The vastly divergent approaches to
commercial speech taken by the two circuit courts in the graphic
tobacco warning labels cases, and other circuit courts in other cases
of commercial disclosure, 83 indicate that it is time that the Supreme
Court clear up once and for all the position that commercial speech
occupies among other First Amendment protections.
283. See, e.g., Nat'1 Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F. 3d 104, 115 (2d Cir.
2001).
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APPENDix A
A few of the graphic warning labels at issue in Discount
Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States and R.J. Reynolds





284. FDA Unveils New Cigarette Health Warnings, FDA CONSUMER
HEALTH INFORMATION (June 2011), http://www.fda. gov/downloads/For
Consumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM259865.pdf.
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Cigarettes cause cancer.
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